Free will and temporal becoming: SMM/DTT and Leibniz’s Monadology

01The question behind the comparison

A world that becomes is not automatically a world containing free agents. New outcomes may be random, mechanically determined, responsive to reasons, or imposed from elsewhere. SMM/DTT’s emphasis on completion can illuminate when an action becomes a settled event, but freedom concerns how that event relates to the agent’s capacities, deliberation and control. The philosophical task is to explain agency within a source-generated world without erasing the difference between the person’s action and a merely external occurrence.

Determinism and fatalism are also different. A deterministic process can include deliberation as a cause of what happens. Fatalism would make the outcome unavoidable regardless of relevant deliberation or action. Introducing indeterminism does not by itself improve control: an unpredictable coin flip is not an exercise of will. A source-based theory can therefore explore a reasons-responsive form of agency even if its update law is deterministic. A stronger libertarian proposal would need to explain how alternatives remain genuinely open and how their resolution belongs to the agent.

The six nested inner levels should not be treated as six hidden decisions made by a small inner person. That would reproduce the problem inside the model. Their useful role would be to organize capacities such as memory, evaluation and action selection in a physically or conceptually explicit way. These are illustrative functions, not established identities of the six DTT levels. Outer completion could mark when an action yields a stable public consequence. The model would still need to explain how the agent’s own organization participates in that completion.

02The single-source and nested-time proposal

SMM begins with one nonspatial generative source. DTT distinguishes its inner production from the outer order in which completed results become accessible. The six inner levels are nested functional dependencies within that production; the seventh denotes outer completion. They are not six independent clocks, six spatial directions, or six simultaneously occupied temporal axes. This distinction makes the framework more specific than a general claim that everything changes: it asks how a world of persistent relations can be generated before its spatial representation is taken for granted. ^[2]

03The comparator’s explanatory structure

Leibniz’s monads are many simple substances, each with its own succession of perceptions. Their coordinated world is explained through pre-established harmony rather than ordinary causal exchange between the monads. The Single Monad’s numerical unity is therefore a major departure, even though both projects question the ultimate status of spatially extended matter.

One can compare two synchronized clocks to clarify the contrast. If their agreement is fixed by their construction, they can display corresponding readings without sending signals to one another. If a common active source continually generates both displays, their coordination has a different explanation. Neither analogy exhausts Leibniz or SMM, but the difference matters: many enduring centers of perspective and one source of generated perspectives face different individuation problems. Leibniz’s account of perception also distinguishes it from reflective awareness, so the word monad should not be equated with an ordinary conscious person or with a modern computational register. ^[1]

04The precise agreement and difference

Leibniz’s monads have internal principles of change, making their activity more than passive reception of external pushes. SMM/DTT similarly wants generated beings to exhibit organized action despite dependence on one source. The difference is that Leibniz grants individual monads a fundamental internal succession, while SMM must explain local agency as a generated pattern within common production.

This creates a useful test of the word source. If every decision is attributed only to the Single Monad, the person’s deliberation risks becoming explanatorily idle. If the source law realizes a person’s memory, reasons and capacities as causally effective organization, local agency can remain meaningful. The philosophical adequacy of that account depends on the chosen conception of freedom. Leibniz’s system also shows that a determined order need not be described as fatalistic indifference to reasons. DTT can strengthen its account by identifying how different reasons would change completed actions. The six nested levels then matter through their contribution to that control structure, rather than through a general association of inner time with freedom. ^[1]

05Worked example: what follows and what does not

An agent chooses between helping a neighbor and continuing a private task. Suppose better information about the neighbor’s need would change the choice, while coercion would undermine it. A reasons-responsive account regards these counterfactual differences as evidence of agency. Now replace the decision by a random switch with the same observed outcome. The event remains unpredictable, but the relation to the agent’s reasons has vanished. This example shows why temporal openness and agency are separate. A DTT model of becoming can provide the setting for action, yet a theory of freedom must identify the relevant control relations within that setting.

06What this comparison contributes

The constructive opportunity is to distinguish source dependence from the absence of local agency. An organism may be wholly dependent on its underlying physical and metaphysical conditions while still acting through its own organized capacities. Whether that suffices for freedom is a philosophical disagreement worth stating explicitly. DTT becomes clearer when it specifies which account it supports, rather than presenting a new temporal vocabulary as a resolution of every debate about responsibility.

THE SAME QUESTION, DIFFERENT STARTING POINTS

The comparison at a glance

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